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Taunya Lovell Banks* 
"[CJontemporary racial disparities in education are not always due to 
racial discrimination, most . . . can be traced . . . to current social 
policies and educational practices or to the vestiges of the dual sys-
tems that scarred the American educational landscape."1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A few days before the fiftieth anniversary of the United States 
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Brown v. Board of Education? a 
state district judge ordered the State of Kansas to stop spending funds 
for public elementary and secondary schools.3 Five months earlier 
that same judge ruled that the state school financing system was a 
"blatant violation of Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution and the 
Equal Protection Clauses of both the Kansas and the United States 
Constitutions."4 According to the judge, the funding system resulted 
in an inequitable distribution of resources among the state's school-
aged children, "dramatically and adversely impact[ing] the learning 
and educational performance of the most vulnerable and/or protected 
Kansas children."5 The school-aged children disproportionately af-
fected by the state's funding scheme were poor and non-white, the 
same children who were Brown's supposed beneficiaries. Fifty years 
after Brown, children in Kansas still do not have equal educational 
opportunities. 
When the United States Supreme Court decided Brown, almost 
all children in twelve southern and border states and the District of 
Columbia attended racially segregated schools mandated by law-de 
jure segregation.6 Urban schools in many other states were de facto 
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1. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving Equality of Educational Opportunity in the Wake of 
Judicial Retreat From Race Sensitive Remedies: Lessons from North Carolina, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
1477, 1479 (2003). 
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3. Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, at *11 (Kan. Dist. Ct., May 11, 
2004). The judge ordered the state to stop spending money for public schools because the legis-
lature failed to restructure its school funding system as ordered by the court. [d. 
4. [d. at *1. 
5. [d. 
6. See Mary Ann Connell, The Road to United States v. Fordice: What is the Duty of Pub-
lic Colleges and Universities in Former De Jure States to Desegregate?, 62 MISS L.J. 285, 305-06 
(1993). As I have written before, I intentionally use the term black or black American in lieu of 
the more fashionable term African-American, because I believe the former term is more accu-
rate and inclusive. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Taunya Lovell Banks, 
Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1708 n.12 (2000). 
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segregated.7 Following the Brown decision, it took several decades of 
litigation in federal and state courts to achieve a significant degree of 
racial integration in public schools.s 
Fifty years later, after more than a decade of increasing resegre-
gation,9 Professor Robinson and others remind us that school-aged 
children in the nation's largest and most diverse cities are most likely 
to attend highly segregated schools.lO Some education advocates ar-
gue that highly segregated public schools-schools where one race 
constitutes 80 to 100% of the population-are inherently unequal.11 
To these advocates, the resegregation of public schools in America 
seems like a betrayal of Brown's spirit. 
Today the measure of equal education for black children often is 
the racial composition of the school population rather than the quality 
of education received.12 This measure of educational equality implies 
7. See Pamela J. Smith, Reliance on the Kindness of Strangers: The Myth of Transracial 
Affinity Versus the Realities of Transracial Educational Pedism, 52 RUTGERS L. REv. I, 102-03 
(1999). 
8. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Move-
ment, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994). Professor Klarman writes: "Across the South as a whole, just 
over 0.15% of black schoolchildren in 1960 and 1.2% in 1964 were attending school with whites. 
Only after the 1964 Civil Rights Act threatened to cut off federal educational funding for segre-
gated school districts and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1966 adopted 
stringent enforcement guidelines did the integration rate in the South rise to 32% in 1968-1969 
and 91.3% in 1972-1973." Id. at 9-10. Fourteen years after Brown, Robert Carter, the NAACP 
lawyer who argued the Kansas case before the Supreme Court, wrote: "few in the country, black 
or white, understood in 1954 that racial segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; that 
the real sickness is that our society in all of its manifestations is geared to the maintenance of 
white superiority." Robert Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 
247 (1968). 
9. Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nighmare?, 
HARVARD UNIV. CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 19 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.civilrightspro-
ject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf. In fact, some observers argue that we are exper-
iencing the first stage of a resegregation of America's public schools. Id. Ten years after Brown 
only 2.3% of black students in the South attended majority white schools, but by 1988 that 
number had grown to 43.5%. Id. A decade later (1998), the percent of black children in the 
South attending majority white schools had dropped more than ten percentage points to 32.7%. 
Id. at 20. According to Orfield and Lee, "[tJhis resegregation is linked to the impact of three 
Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995, [Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 79 (1995); Free-
man v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Dowell v. Oklahoma City, 498 U.S. 237 (1991),Jlimiting school 
desegregation and authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools." Id. at 18. 
10. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Fulfilling Brown's Legacy: Bearing the Costs of Realizing 
Equality, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 7 (2004); Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 34 (87% for black 
students and 86% for Latino students). Ironically, students in rural communities and small 
towns and not students in the nation's largest cities are more likely to attend racially integrated 
schools. 
11. Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 27-28. 
12. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470, 471 (1976); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVE-
NANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 
119-20 (2004). The United States Supreme Court wrote in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1,25-26 (1971), that the extent of racial integration was the most 
important factor in determining whether a previously segregated system was now unitary. For a 
more contemporary view of Brown's meaning, see Ellis Cose, A Dream Deferred, NEWSWEEK, 
May 17, 2004, at 52; Peter Kirsanow, The Glass Is Half Full, Nat'l Rev. Online (May 17, 2004), at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/commentlkirsanow20040517073O.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); 
Louis Menand, Civil Actions: Brown v. Board of Education and the Limits of Law, THE NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 12,2001, at 92; David E. Thigpen, An Elusive Dream in the Promised Land, TIME 
May 10, 2004, at 32. 
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that schools without white students are presumptively inferior. Yet 
the "belief that black students cannot get a decent education unless 
there are white students in the classroom ... has always been disputed 
by some [black]-Americans."13 Increasingly, educational achievement 
for children of all races is tied to socio-economic status.14 Since whites 
as a group are more affluent than non-whites, race and class tend to 
get conflated leaving uninformed people to conclude that racial inte-
gration alone is the measure of equal educational opportunities for 
black and other non-white children.15 
Legal scholars writing about equal educational opportunities tend 
to focus either on ways to achieve racial integration16 or funding 
equalityP Few scholars explore how to structure new theories of edu-
cational equality that acknowledge and squarely address the twin ten-
sions inherent in Brown-racial integration and equal educational 
opportunity for all children.18 This country's experience over the past 
fifty years illustrates how you can have one without the other. 
Achieving both in a racially polarized society like America will be a 
real challenge for future lawyers. 
Recently the Supreme Court reminded us of why new theories 
about educational equality are so urgently needed. In Grutter v. Bol-
linger,19 a bare majority ruled that a public college or university's de-
sire to create a diverse student body is a compelling educational 
interest.2o Yet Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, cautioned: 
Race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. This 
requirement reflects that racial classifications, however compelling 
their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed 
13. Menand, supra, note 12, at 91. The esteemed black educator Dr. Benjamin Mays speak-
ing in 1974 said, "Black people, while working to implement Brown, should recognize that inte-
gration alone does not provide a quality education, and that much of the substance of quality 
education can be provided to Black children in the interim." Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra 
note 12, at 487 (citing the writings of several other black scholars). 
14. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
15. The discussion of educational equality cannot be limited to black children, Brown's 
original parties in interest. Today, Latino children in particular have educational experiences 
that mirror those of a disproportionate number of black school-aged children. 
16. See generally SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND 
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004); WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA· 
TION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S 
LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter WHAT BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID]; Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School 
Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728 (1986). 
17. See generally BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 12; WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 16; Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New 
Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 V AND. L. REV. 101 (1995). 
18. See generally Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education For Minority Pupils: Brown 
Confounded or Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGA. 
TION (Derrick Bell ed., 1980) [hereinafter SHADES OF BROWN] (arguing that desegregation is 
useful only if it provides equal and effective education to minority students and that the focus 
should be on factors such as class size, teacher experience, per pupil expenditure, et cetera). 
19. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
20. [d. at 307. 
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no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a perma-
nent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamen-
tal equal protection principle . . . . The requirement that all race-
conscious admissions programs have a termination point 'assure[s] 
all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of 
all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken 
in the service of the goal of equality itself.' ... We expect that 25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be neces-
sary to further the interest approved today.21 
At the same time, members of the Court are quite aware of the 
glaring educational inequities in public education that disproportion-
ately impact non-white children.22 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, con-
curring in Grutter wrote that despite a "strong ... public[ ] desire for 
improved education systems ... it remains the current reality that many 
minority students encounter markedly inadequate and unequal educa-
tional opportunities."23 
Professor Robinson accurately describes why it is difficult to 
achieve meaningful school integration, but her recommendation that 
better school funding methods be developed as an interim measure to 
counteract the unequal education non-white students receive in highly 
segregated schools mischaracterizes the problem. Like some scholars 
and the lawyers who litigated Brown, Professor Robinson conflates 
the twin goals of Brown, integration and equal educational opportuni-
ties. In this response to her lecture, I explain how these goals got 
conflated and why unlinking and more clearly articulating the ratio-
nale for each may ultimately lead to the achievement of both goals. 
21. Id. at 342-43 (emphasis added). 
22. I intentionally limit my discussion to black Americans and Latinos because the status of 
Asian-Americans is more complex. Although Asians are characterized by some as a "model 
minority" there is considerable variation in high school graduation rates among Asian ethnic 
groups. For example, a high percentage of Asian-Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, and Ko-
rean are high school graduates (85.4%, 77.6%, 87.4%, 91.4%, 86.4% respectively), whereas a 
low percentage of Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, and Vietnamese graduate from high school 
(47.1 %, 40.7%, 50.5%, 61.9% respectively). Max Niedzwiecki & T.e. Duong, SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN AM. STAT. PROFILE, 2004, at 15, at http://www.searac.orglresourcectr.html (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2004). Similar variations are reflected among these groups when comparing the percent-
age with bachelor or higher degrees (Asian-Indian (60.9%), Chinese (46.6%), Filipino (41.7%), 
Japanese (40.4%), Korean (43.1%), Cambodian (9.1%), Hmong (7.4%), Laotian (7.6%), 
Vietnamese (19.5%». Id. I also do not specifically address the separate circumstances of 
America's indigenous populations, but believe that my argument for educational equity devel-
oped more fully in this essay also applies to these groups as well. 
23. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added). Writing for herself, and joined by Justice 
Stephen Breyer, Justice Ginsburg continues: "Despite these inequalities, some minority students 
are able to meet the high threshold requirements set for admission to the country's finest under-
graduate and graduate educational institutions. As lower school education in minority commu-
nities improves, an increase in the number of such students may be anticipated. From today's 
vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span, pro-
gress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset af-
firmative action." Id. 
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II. BROWN THE IcON: SOCIAL EQUALITY, THE MEASURE OF 
FULL CITIZENSHIP 
A. Plessy v. Ferguson Reexamined 
35 
The Brown decision is a mirror image of Plessy v. Ferguson,24 and 
thus the shadow of that Court's unanimous consensus that blacks are 
not the social equals of whites still hangs over US.25 In Plessy, all but 
one of the Supreme Court Justices agreed that a state law mandating 
separate train cars for whites and blacks when applied to travel within 
the state was constitutional. The majority opinion, written by Justice 
Henry Billings Brown from Massachusetts, said that racial segregation 
laws were merely legal distinctions that did not "necessarily imply the 
inferiority of either race to the other."26 He distinguished what he 
characterized as political equality (exclusion from juries) from social 
equality (separation of the races in schools, theaters, and trains).27 In 
essence, riding integrated train coaches was an expression of social 
equality; blacks were not the social equals of whites; and the Four-
teenth Amendment, Justice Brown wrote, only protects legal or politi-
cal equality.28 
The lone dissenting Justice, John Marshall Harlan, a former slave-
owner from Kentucky, agreed that blacks were not and probably 
never would be the social equals of whites.29 Nevertheless he chas-
tised the majority for being disingenuous in saying that riding in ra-
cially separate train cars constitutes legal equality for black 
Americans. Justice Harlan believed that separating the races in public 
spaces like train cars violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause because state laws cannot treat people different 
24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
25. For a discussion of this point in the context of education, see generally A'lelia Robinson 
Henry, Perpetuating Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the Dilemma of Black Access to Public 
and Higher Education, 27 J.L. & BDue. 47, 63-64 (1998), arguing that the spirit of Plessy is being 
re-evoked in ways that deprives African-Americans access to, and representation in, quality pub-
lic and higher education, thus further widening the disparity between black and white public and 
higher educational attainment. 
26. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-43. And therefore racial segregation laws did not constitute a 
badge of slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. Specifically the Court wrote: "A 
statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races - a distinc-
tion which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white 
men are distinguished from the other race by color - has no tendency to destroy the legal equal-
ity of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude." Id. 
27. Id. at 545-46. 
28. Id. at 544. If enforced segregation suggests racial inferiority, wrote Justice Brown, it is 
only because that is the interpretation African-Americans put on the practice! Id. at 551. 
29. He wrote, "[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country .... So, 
I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time .... " Id. at 559. 
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solely based on race.30 Thus, he wrote those now famous words: 
"There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind."31 
Although Justice Harlan never advocated social equality for 
black Americans, he probably would consider the underlying premise 
of Brown, that public schools cannot be segregated based solely on 
race, an example of legal equality.32 In contrast, when Thurgood Mar-
shall was Special Counsel for the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, he and many other civil rights advocates saw Brown 
as signaling the end of social inequality between whites and non-
whites, especially black Americans.33 Educational equality between 
races is an essential component of social equality. 
B. The Promise of Brown 
Three years after the United States Supreme Court decided 
Plessy v. Ferguson, it quickly became clear that the "separate but 
equal" doctrine never would result in educational equality for black 
Americans. The Court in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Ed-
ucation34 ruled that a state is not required under the Constitution to 
maintain a high school for black children even though it maintains a 
high school for whites.35 Since the Court in Cumming failed to detail 
what constitutes equality in public education for black Americans,36 
black lawyers began to litigate this issue in a wide range of cases.37 
The Brown decision represents the culmination of an assault on the 
"separate but equal" doctrine. 
By the mid 1930s, NAACP lawyers under the direction of Charles 
Hamilton Houston initiated a legal campaign to attack application of 
30. Id. The Plessy decision was met by relative silence and apparent indifference in the 
nation. See Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death and Resurrection of 
Racial Formalism, in CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, 181 n.2 (Michael C. Dorf ed., (2004». In 
truth Plessy was the culmination of a whole series of court cases of that era undermining at-
tempts to secure racial equality for blacks dating back to the 1870s. 
31. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559. 
32. Historian Charles Lofgren cited an editorial that appeared in the New York Times fol-
lowing the Brown decision that stated: "the words [Harlan] used in his lonely dissent ... have 
become in effect ... a part of the law of the land. . .. [T]here was not one word in Chief Justice 
Warren's opinion that was inconsistent with the earlier views of Justice Harlan." Editorial, Jus-
tice Harlan Concurring, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1954 at § 4, at E10, (quoted in CHARLES LoFGREN, 
THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 204 (1987)). 
33. See infra notes 44 and 63 and accompanying text. 
34. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
35. Id. at 545. 
36. Instead the Court wrote: "The education of the people in schools maintained by state 
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and any interference on the part of the 
Federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a 
clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land." Id. 
37. For a discussion of this litigation, see generally Robert A. Leflar & Wylie H. Davis, 
Segregation in the Public Schools - 1953, 67 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1954) and Arthur Larson, The 
New Law of Race Relations, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 470, 482-83 n.27. 
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the Plessy doctrine in the area of education.38 At first the lawyers did 
not challenge the "separate but equal" doctrine directly. The legal 
strategy was to accept racial segregation in primary and secondary 
schools but to demand equalization-genuine equality-in facilities, 
per pupil expenditures,39 and teacher pay.40 
The lawyers also began litigating a series of cases aimed at white-
only state professional schools. On their face, the higher education 
cases also focused on enforcing the "separate but equal doctrine," ar-
guing that integration was warranted where the state failed to provide 
comparable facilities for blacks seeking graduate degrees, and the 
United States Supreme Court agreed.41 The ultimate goal of both the 
public and professional school cases, however, was the elimination of 
the "separate but equal" doctrine.42 
Thurgood Marshall and the other NAACP lawyers chose public 
school segregation cases to challenge the doctrine partly because they 
and other civil rights advocates believed that "education was the path 
to social advancement for [black] Americans, and partly because 
[they] thought that if blacks and whites mixed together as children 
they would be less susceptible to racial prejudice as adults. "43 This 
38. See generally GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 131-33 (1983). 
39. Thurgood Marshall did a survey of southern schools in 1948-49 and found widespread 
disparities. For example, the public school system in Atlanta annually spent $570 per white 
student compared to $228.05 per black student. Menand, supra note 12, at 94. 
40. See Morris v. Williams, 149 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1945) (holding that the customary discrim-
ination against colored teachers, with respect to salaries, solely on the account of race or color 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Alston v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 
1940) (issuing an injunction restraining the school board from discriminating on the grounds of 
race or color in fixing salaries to be paid school teachers); Davis v. Cook, 80 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. 
Ga. 1948) (holding that salaries, when fixed, may not be discriminatory because of color or race). 
41. Starting in the mid 1930s, NAACP lawyers litigated a series of cases directed at state 
supported professional schools that barred blacks. In 1935 NAACP lawyers successfully tried 
out their strategy when they represented Donald Murray, who was suing in state court for his 
admission to the law school at the University of Maryland, alleging that restricting entry to the 
state's only public law school denied Murray equal protection of the law. Pearson v. Murray, 169 
Md. 478 (1936). In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the 
Maryland Court of Appeals. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (refusal to 
admit a black applicant to the University of Oklahoma in pursuit of a Doctorate in Education 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no sepa-
rate facility within the state for black students); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding 
that the separate law schools at the University to Texas were not equal with regard to books, 
rooms, faculty, staff, accreditation, and certain other intangibles); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (refusal to admit a qualified black applicant to the 
University of Oklahoma School of Law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Missouri ex rei. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (refusal to admit black 
applicant to the University of Missouri Law School violated the Equal Protection Clause where 
no separate facility existed for blacks in the state). 
42. Robert L. Carter, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 86 MICH. 
L. REV. 1083, 1084-85 (1988) (reviewing MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY 
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987». 
43. Menand, supra note 12, at 92 (emphasis added). 
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second objective, racial integration, we now know, does not automati-
cally result in the first objective, equal educational opportunities.44 
The NAACP's strategic goal became more apparent during the 
litigation of Sweatt v. Painter.45 Buoyed by their success in two earlier 
cases where the United States Supreme Court ruled that states cannot 
exclude blacks based on race from the only state graduate or profes-
sional school, the NAACP lawyers sued the University of Texas.46 
The lawsuit sought the admission of a black applicant to the state's 
only law schoo1.47 Ultimately the trial judge found the newly estab-
44. Former Harvard Law Professor Derrick Bell wrote that Thurgood Marshall and the 
lawyers in Brown were serving two masters - their clients, who were the parents of the black 
school children and wanted equal educational opportunities for their children, and the liberal, 
primarily white, financial backers of the litigation effort who believed that integration (and as-
similation) was the key to equality for black Americans. Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 
12, at 489-90 n.59 (citing Leroy Clark, The Lawyer and the Civil Rights Movement - Catalytic 
Agent or Counter-Revolutionary?, 19 KAN. L. REV. 459, 469 (1971». Robert Carter argued 
before the United States Supreme Court that equal educational opportunities are cornerstones 
in preparing one for American citizenship and that "Negro" children were denied that opportu-
nity: "appellants showed that they and other Negro children similarly situated were placed at a 
serious disadvantage with respect to their opportunity to develop citizenship skills .... " Robert 
L. Carter, Brown v. Board of Education (Oral Argument Dec. 9, 1952), in BROWN V. BOARD: 
THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 13 (Leon Friedman ed., 
2004). Furthermore James Nabrit argued before the Court that black citizens who fought in the 
country's wars were also fighting for full citizenship for them, and their children: 
It would appear to me that in 1952, the Negro should not be viewed as anybody's 
burden. He is a citizen. He is performing his duties in peace and in war, and today, on 
the bloody hills of Korea, he is serving in an unsegregated war. All we ask of this Court 
is that it say that under the Constitution he is entitled to live and send his children to 
school in the District of Columbia unsegregated, with the children of his war comrades. 
That is simple. The Constitution gives him that right. 
James M. Nabrit, Jr., Bolling v. Sharpe (Oral Argument Dec. 10, 1952), in BROWN V. BOARD: 
THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, supra, at 142. 
45. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
46. Judge Carter wrote that NAACP lawyers actually first made a direct challenge to the 
"separate but equal" doctrine in their amicus brief in Westminster School District v. Mendez, 161 
F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) (holding that by enforcing the segregation of school children of Mexican 
descent against their will and contrary to the laws of California, respondents have violated the 
federal laws as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution by depriving 
them of liberty and property without due process of law and by denying to them the equal 
protection of the laws). Carter, supra note 42, at 1084 n.5. 
47. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629-31 (1950). Instead of granting the plaintiff the requested 
relief, the trial judge gave the state six months to create a separate law school for black Texans, 
dismissing the suit when the state hastily complied. [d. at 632. On appeal, the Texas Court of 
Civil Appeals, at the State Attorney General's request, reversed and remanded the case "re-
questing the [trial] court to rule on the question of segregation and ... for further evidence 
showing the establishment of a separate but equal law school." Letter from Thurgood Marshall 
to William Hastie (Apr. 3, 1947) (on file at Thurgood Marshall Law Library, NAACP Papers, 
Box III-B-15 at 268, Univ. of Md., Baltimore, Md.). Surprised at the ruling, Thurgood Marshall, 
in a letter to William Hastie, a prominent black lawyer and Marshall confidant who then was 
serving as the Governor of the Virgin Islands, wrote: 
[t]he interesting thing is that the court refused to rule as a matter of law that segrega-
tion was invalid and the Chief Justice made the statement from the bench that it was 
the appellant's position that segregation and discrimination were tied up together and 
could not be separated and that he was not willing to rule that that point was precluded 
from the case. . . . So, whether we want it or not, we are now faced with the proposi-
tion of going into the question of segregation as such. 
[d. at 268. The letter from Marshall continues: 
I think we should do so because even if we don't take the case far, we at least should 
experiment on [sic] the type of evidence which we may be able to produce on this 
question. For example, we want to produce experts such as Charlie Thompson to tes-
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Ii shed black state law school to be "substantially equivalent" to the 
University of Texas Law School, and the state appellate court affirmed 
the ruling.48 In the petition for certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court, Marshall attacked the "separate but equal" doctrine 
head-on, but the Court declined to address the Plessy issue, ruling in 
Sweatt's favor on a narrower point.49 
Instead of striking down the "separate but equal" doctrine, the 
Court made compliance with the doctrine more difficult. A unani-
mous Court held that in determining whether racially separate state 
facilities are equal under the Constitution, it would consider both tan-
gible and intangible factors like the reputation of the school, its 
faculty, and alumni. 50 The Court's further working out of what consti-
tutes equal educational opportunity was cut short by its decision in 
Brown. 
By shifting the arguments in Sweatt and Brown from equalization 
to desegregation both the NAACP lawyers and the Court in Brown 
assumed that desegregation constituted equalization. 51 But in fact, 
the graduate and professional school cases had always been about in-
tegration.52 The petitioner's brief in Brown shifted the focus to deseg-
regation as the ultimate equalizer rather than equalization itself.53 
tify as to the inevitable effects of segregation in per capita expenditures, etc. We are 
also contemplating putting up Otto Kleinberg to testify as to the racial characteristics 
not being present and other evils of segregation. We are also contemplating putting on 
anthropologists to show that there is no difference between folks. 
Id. at 268-69. 
48. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632. 
49. Id. at 631. 
50. Id. at 633-35. 
51. Judge Carter also wrote that the NAACP lawyers used the same strategy in McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that once admitted, blacks must be 
treated the same as whites). McLaurin was argued before the Supreme Court around the same 
time as Sweatt. Carter, supra note 42, at 1089. 
52. Marshall, in a searing letter to the editor of a black-owned Houston newspaper, wrote: 
here is our position. The United States Supreme Court in the [Gaines] case said that in 
the absence of equal facilities in a separate system, Negroes are entitled to admission in 
the existing facilities. As I understand your position, we should not even use this prece-
dent, weak as it is but should rather seek to have the court compel the school officials 
to set up separate but equal facilities. To my mind, if we do this, we not only do not 
advance from the [Gaines] case but we would be actually ... making a step backward 
. . . . We will not ask for segregated facilities and will not admit the validity of the 
segregated [sic] statutes of Texas. 
Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Carter Wesley (October 3,1947) (on file at Thurgood Mar-
shall Law Library, NAACP Papers, Box III-B-15 at 437, Univ. of Md., Baltimore, Md.). 
53. The brief stated: 
Racial segregation in public schools reduces the benefits of public education to one 
group solely on the basis of race and color and is a constitutionally proscribed distinc-
tion. Even assuming that the segregated schools attended by appellants are not inferior 
to other elementary schools in Topeka with respect to physical facilities, instruction and 
courses of study, unconstitutional inequality inheres in the retardation of intellectual 
development and distortion of personality which Negro children suffer as a result of 
enforced isolation in school from the general public school population. Such injury and 
inequality are established as facts on this appeal by the uncontested findings of the 
District Court. 
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Thus it is unsurprising that "equal" education in a post-Brown world 
became synonymous with racially integrated schools.54 
C. Rereading Brown 
In the United States Supreme Court, NAACP lawyers in Brown 
argued strategically that "segregated public schools are not 'equal' 
and cannot be made 'equal,"'55 and hence black children are denied 
the equal protection of the law. Using studies by Kenneth and Mamie 
Clark, black social scientists, Marshall and Robert Carter argued that 
racially segregated schools stamp black children with a badge of infer-
iority,56 a direct counter to the claim of the majority in Plessy. The 
Supreme Court agreed.57 
The direct attack on segregation rather than equalization adopted 
by the NAACP lawyers was resisted by some southern local NAACP 
branches.58 Many parents simply wanted better black schools for their 
children.59 Reluctant to disregard the Plessy doctrine, the lower 
courts in Kansas, South Carolina, Delaware, and Virginia addressed 
the equalization issue.6o 
Brief for Appellants at 5, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No.1); see also MARK V. 
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 
1936-1961 151-52 (1994). 
54. BELL, SILENT COVENANT, supra note 12, at 120. 
55. Brown, 347 U.S. at 488. As the Court noted, in two of the six public school cases involv-
ing the "separate but equal doctrine" (Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 
(1899) and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927» the validity of the doctrine was not chal-
lenged. Id. at 491. In the four remaining cases, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 
637 (1950), Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), and 
Missouri ex reI. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), all graduate school cases, the inequality 
was based on the absence for blacks of specific educational benefits available to similarly quali-
fied whites. [d. at 491-92. 
56. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
57. Id. The Court wrote: "[o]ur decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of 
these tangible factors ... [w]e must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public 
education." Id. at 492. 
58. Carter, supra note 42, at 1089. Robert Carter, writing in 1991, said that when in late 
1949 and early 1950 he and Marshall wanted to challenge segregation directly, they encountered 
considerable opposition. But by 1950 Marshall had persuaded the NAACP board to "endorse[ ] 
a new policy of refusing to take any cases fighting school discrimination except those that at-
tacked segregation per se." Robert L. Carter, A Tribute to Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 33, 39-40 (1991). Several black lawyers from the South connected with the NAACP op-
posed the change in policy resigning from the National Legal Committee in protests. "They 
believed that the NAACP should not abandon litigation that sought to equalize educational 
facilities." Id. One of those lawyers, Oliver Hill from Virginia, was later counsel in Davis v. 
County School Board, one of the five cases in Brown. Id. 
59. Derrick Bell wrote that Davis v. County School Board, one of the cases consolidated 
with Brown, stemmed from a request to the NAACP by blacks in Prince Edward County for 
legal assistance" 'following an unsuccessful year-long effort to obtain a new high schooL'" Bell, 
Serving Two Masters, supra note 12, at 477 n.21 (citing Doxey A. Wilkerson, The Negro School 
Movement in Virginia: From 'Equalization' to 'Integration; in II THE MAKING OF BLACK 
AMERICA 259, 269 (August Meier & Elliott Rudwick eds., 1969». But they were told by the 
NAACP representatives that the organization" 'could not help with litigation unless a suit was 
filed to abolish school segregation. '" Id. 
60. In Kansas the three-judge district court found that segregation in public education had a 
detrimental effect upon black children, but denied relief on the ground that the black and white 
schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educa-
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Unresolved is whether the NAACP lawyers should have pushed 
more specifically for both equalization and the end of de jure segrega-
tion,61 rather than assume that integration would automatically result 
in equal educational opportunities for black children.62 In hindsight, 
it is difficult to predict whether a theory that encompassed both goals 
as separate but connected rights would have been as readily accepted 
by the Court and the nation. Nevertheless, the legal strategy of the 
NAACP lawyers in Brown reflects the naIvete of racial progressives in 
the 1930s and 1940s. They believed that elimination of the "separate 
but equal" doctrine would solve the problem of racial discrimination 
against black Americans.63 They did not factor in the effect of class 
differences among whites and blacks on equal educational 
opportunities. 
tional qualifications of teachers. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951). 
The district court found no substantial difference in the school physical plants, student transpor· 
tation, curricula, or teacher qualifications. [d. When the Supreme Court ruled in Sweatt v. 
Painter that both tangible and intangible factors determined whether schools were equal, at least 
in higher education, the equalization question in the Kansas case would have been whether the 
Sweatt rationale also applied to primary and secondary public schools. But this issue was never 
raised by either the courts or lawyers in Brown. 
In contrast, the South Carolina court found that the black schools were inferior to the white 
schools and ordered the state to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 
F. Supp. 529, 537-38 (E.D.S.C. 1951). Similarly in Virginia the federal district court admitted 
that the facilities were unequal, but sustained the validity of the contested provisions mandating 
segregation and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization pro-
gram. Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337,340-41 (E.D. Va. 1952). In Delaware, the 
Chancellor's decree ordering desegregation was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, 
which intimated, however, that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the 
decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. Belton v. 
Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 870-71 (1952). 
61. Mark Tushnet wrote in his 1987 book examining the strategy of the NAACP lawyers 
that there was no single conception of equality, and the NAACP engaged in a process of con-
structing one out of many possible conceptions of equality. Professor Thshnet believed that 
sacrificing desegregation for educational equity would have resulted in a better quality of educa-
tion for black children. TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 158-65 (1987), Judge Carter heartily dis-
agrees with Professor Thshnet on this point. Carter, supra note 42, at 1091 (citing TUSHNET, 
supra note 42). 
62. Professor Robinson cites Robert Carter's reflections twenty-five years later. Judge 
Carter wrote: 
while the pre-Brown thesis that equal education and integrated education are synony-
mous has never had a fair test, its chance of being afforded a just demonstration in the 
foreseeable future seems quite unlikely. Whether our views about the necessity of 
school integration were correct is really beside the point. Current public intransigence 
makes clear that we cannot allow ourselves to become the prisoners of dogma. While 
integration must remain the long-range goal, we must search for alternatives, because 
the reality is that hundreds of thousands of black children are attending all black or 
predominantly black schools in the urban North and South. These schools are woefully 
inadequate and provide no tools which will enable poor blacks to become a part of the 
mainstream of the social, economic, and political life of the country. 
Robert L. Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-five Years Later: Looking Backward into the Fu-
ture, 14 HARV. c.R.-c.L.L. REV. 615, 621 (1979). 
63. See Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 12, at 489 ("For many civil rights workers, 
success in obtaining racially balanced schools seems to have become a symbol of the nation's 
commitment to equal opportunity-not only in education, but in housing, employment, and 
other fields where the effects of racial discrimination are still present."); Robert L. Carter, A 
Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 18, at 23 ("[Tlhe basic 
postulate of our strategy and theory in Brown was that the elimination of enforced segregated 
education would necessarily result in equal education."). 
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III. THE AFTERMATH OF BROWN 
"Once you begin the process of segregation, it has its own inertia. It 
continues on without enforcement. "64 
A. Generally 
The 1954 Brown decision (Brown l) represented a tremendous 
victory because it signaled the beginning of the end of separate but 
equal laws, but the celebration was short-lived. Brown II involved the 
question of how to implement the decision given the different circum-
stances of the individual cases.65 In Brown II the United States Su-
preme Court, for the first and only time in more than two hundred 
years, deferred enforcement of a constitutionally protected right, de-
laying implementation of Brown I by ordering that school desegrega-
tion be carried out "with all deliberate speed."66 As Robert Carter, 
the lawyer who argued the Kansas case before the Supreme Court 
reminds us, the dictionary defines "deliberate" as "slow and even; un-
hurried."67 In other words, concern about white resistance in the 
South was elevated above the constitutional rights of black 
Americans.68 
All deliberate speed notwithstanding, there still was massive re-
sistance to Brown in the white South lasting for more than a decade.69 
It took yet another decade-over twenty years in total-to signifi-
cantly desegregate public schools in southern and border States.70 
During this time, NAACP lawyers continued to press for racial inte-
gration, doing nothing to minimize the existing education inequality of 
64. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 854 n.1 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing a statement by 
demographer William Lamson, made during the district court trial). 
65. The Delaware Supreme Court in Belton v. Gebhart had ordered immediate desegrega-
tion of the state schools. Belton, 87 A.2d at 362. By 1955 the Kansas and District of Columbia 
schools had already initiated desegregation, so less time might have been needed for those 
schools than for the South Carolina and Virginia school systems. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 
U.S. 294, 299 (1955). 
66. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301; Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation: A Contempo-
rary Analysis, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 889-90 (1993). 
67. Robert Carter, Speech at the University of Maryland (Nov. 2003). Carter wrote: "after 
more than ten years of waiting for Brown II's objectives to be attained 'with all deliberate 
speed,' the United States Supreme Court lost patience and began to press for adherence to 
Brown by requiring that the dual system be dismantled in fact." Robert L. Carter, A Reassess-
ment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 18, at 24. Carter wrote: "it is clear 
that what the formula required was movement toward compliance on terms that the white South 
could accept." Carter, supra note 8, at 243. 
68. Reginald Oh writes that there was an important linguistic shift between Brown I and 
Brown II. The Court in Brown II states that Brown I declared "racial discrimination" unconsti-
tutional. However, the Court in Brown I never mentions the phrase "racial discrimination." 
Brown I states only that "segregation" is unconstitutional. Professor Oh argued that this was a 
significant shift making it more difficult for petitioners to achieve racial desegregation. Reginald 
Oh, Constructing a Critical Linguistic Analysis of Law (2004) (draft on file with the author). 
69. Robert L. Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra 
note 18, at 24. 
70. See supra note 8. 
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all-black schools, leaving a generation of post-Brown children poorly 
educated.?1 This condition persists. 
Today although public school systems are integrated, most black 
children in large urban areas attend highly segregated schools.72 The 
lack of racial integration per se, however, is not the most pressing 
problem. The real problem with today's de facto segregation is that 
black and other non-white "students in highly segregated neighbor-
hood schools are many times more likely to be in schools of concen-
trated poverty."73 Studies find a link between concentrated poverty, 
school opportunities, and achievement levels.74 Harvard sociologists 
Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee in their 2004 report, Brown at 50: 
King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare, conclude that 
children in these schools tend to be less healthy, to have weaker 
preschool experiences, to have only one parent, to move more fre-
quently and have unstable educational experiences, to attend classes 
taught by less experienced or unqualified teachers, to have friends 
and classmates with lower levels of achievement, to be in schools 
with fewer demanding pre-collegiate courses and more remedial 
courses, and to have higher teacher turnover. Many of these 
schools are also deteriorated and lack key resources.?5 
Integration without equalization does not constitute equal educa-
tional opportunity. In some instances equalization, especially during 
the early school years, may be more important to the achievement of 
equal educational opportunity than racial integration. Equalization in 
primary and secondary schools will correct racial imbalances in the 
pool of highly qualified college applicants. Children in school districts 
where it is impossible to dismantle highly race-segregated public 
schools should get the resources necessary for them to excel without 
71. Michael Klarman wrote: "Blacks were ... divided over whether to pursue ... desegre-
gation - a 1955 Gallup poll found that only 53 percent of southern blacks supported Brown -
given the fierce white resistance to desegregation, dramatic recent improvements in some black 
schools, the likely dismissals of black teachers after schools desegregated, and the ambivalence 
of the black community over black children attending predominately white schools." Michael J. 
Klarman, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
RACIAL EQUALITY 352 (2004). 
72. Maryland, a border state, ranks fourth among the top ten states in the country. Ironi-
cally, only two deep southern states, Mississippi and Alabama, rank among that top ten. Orfield 
& Lee, supra note 9, at 26. Also included among the top ten states are New York, Illinois, 
Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Alabama, and Mississippi. /d. Orfield and Lee 
wrote: 
desegregation of black students continued to increase in the South until the late 1980s, 
possibly reflecting the gradual decline in residential segregation levels. Then, beginning 
in the 1990s, segregation began to increase in spite of evidence from the 2000 Census of 
further declines in residential segregation during this decade. This resegregation is 
linked to the impact of three Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995[, Dowell 
v. Okla. City, 498U.S. 237 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 u.S. 467 (1992); Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995),jlimiting school desegregation and authorizing a return to 
segregated neighborhood schools. 
[d. at 18. 
73. [d. at 21. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 21-22. 
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having to rely on the presence of more affluent racially diverse fami-
lies to generate these resources. 
B. The Brown Case on Remand 
Derrick Bell writes that NAACP lawyers handling post-Brown 
cases pushed for integration at the expense of equalization and their 
clients'interests.76 The outcome of the Brown case on remand to the 
District Court of Kansas reflects the consequences of this decision.77 
Immediately after the 1954 Supreme Court decision, the Kansas court 
concluded that the Topeka school district had made a good faith effort 
to end de jure segregation.78 Nevertheless, the court retained jurisdic-
tion over the case until it felt that the district had fully complied with 
the Supreme Court's mandate.79 This judicial oversight lasted more 
than forty years.80 
Tellingly in 1955 the federal district judge wrote: "[d]esegregation 
does not mean that there must be intermingling of the races in all 
school districts. It means only that they may not be prevented from 
intermingling or going to school together because of race or COIOr."81 
In other words, states could not actively prevent racial integration in 
public schools, but there was no affirmative duty to create a racially 
diverse learning environment. 
No further judicial action occurred until Linda Brown, now an 
adult and parent herself, along with other black parents of school aged 
children intervened in 1979. Their lawyers argued that the Brown 
mandate had not been realized.82 The primary focus of the interven-
ers was to determine whether the Topeka schools were sufficiently in-
tegrated.83 The school district responded that 
76. Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 12, at 482-85. 
77. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955). 
78. ld. at 470. 
79. ld. 
80. The court finally relinquished jurisdiction over the case in 1999. Brown v. Unified Sch. 
Dist. No. 501, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1213 (D. Kan. 1999). 
Id. 
81. Brown, 139 F. Supp. at 470. 
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (D. Kan. 1987). 
83. Id. at 1294. The trial judge found that 
[t]he student attendance figures for the 1985-86 school year bear little resemblance to 
the figures for 1954. None of the former de jure black schools was open in 1985. Of the 
twenty-six elementary schools, only one had a majority black student population. 
Three had majority minority populations .... Roughly twenty-nine percent of all black 
elementary students attended these schools. Five elementary schools had student 
populations over ninety percent white. These schools accounted for approximately 
twenty-four percent of the white elementary student population. No school had a 
ninety-five percent white student population .... None of the three high schools ... 
had a majority minority population in the 1985-86 school year. One high school, To-
peka West High School, had a white student population exceeding ninety percent .... 
It served roughly forty-one percent of all white high school students in the district. 
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[the] plaintiffs place too much emphasis on the racial balance of 
students as a measure of a constitutional violation . . . . [F]actors 
other than student assignment count in the determination of a con-
stitutional violation, and that these factors (e.g., allocation of re-
sources, uniformity of curricula and instruction) indicate the district 
operates a unitary school system.84 
45 
The district judge, consistent with his earlier statements, ruled that 
racial imbalance even in previously de jure school systems is unconsti-
tutional only if purposefully maintained,85 and that was not the case in 
Topeka.86 
Interestingly, the school district's asserted measures of equality -
uniformity in resource allocation, curriculum, and teachers - sound 
more like an incomplete application of the Sweatt criteria.87 Had the 
federal district judge really applied the Sweatt criteria as part of his 
analysis, he might have concluded that equal educational opportunity 
for black children had not been achieved. But the specific issue of 
equalization did not arise because the school district closed the four de 
jure black schools and because the court found no evidence to suggest 
that these school closings were done to avoid racial integration.88 
84. Id. at 1295. 
85. Id. at 1296 (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); Dayton 
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417, 420 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1,24 (1971». 
86. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1297. 
87. In Sweatt, the Court wrote: 
[tJhe University of Texas Law School, from which petitioner was excluded, was staffed 
by a faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors, some of whom are na-
tionally recognized authorities in their field. Its student body numbered 850. The li-
brary contained over 65,000 volumes. Among the other facilities available to the 
students were a law review, moot court facilities, scholarship funds, and Order of the 
Coif affiliation. The school's alumni occupy the most distinguished positions in the 
private practice of the law and in the public life of the State. 
339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950). 
The law school for Negroes which was to have opened in February, 1947, would have 
had no independent faculty or library. The teaching was to be carried on by four mem-
bers of the University of Texas Law School faculty, who were to maintain their offices 
at the University of Texas while teaching at both institutions. Few of the 10,000 
volumes ordered for the library had arrived; nor was there any full-time librarian. The 
school lacked accreditation. Since the trial of this case, respondents report the opening 
of a law school at the Texas State University for Negroes. It is apparently on the road 
to full accreditation. It has a faculty of five full-time professors; a student body of 23; a 
library of some 16,500 volumes serviced by a full-time staff; a practice court and legal 
aid association; and one alumnus who has become a member of the Texas bar. 
Id. at 633. 
88. The court wrote: 
[aJll four de jure black schools have been closed. The de jure black school (McKinley) 
in North Topeka ... was closed in 1955 and the black children were assigned to Grant 
or Quincy elementary schools. Grant was closed in 1977. Now all elementary students 
in North Topeka attend Quincy School. Washington and Buchanan schools were both 
closed by 1962. Monroe was closed in 1978. The Pierce School was closed in 1959, one 
year after its attendance zone was annexed into the district. It was an all-black school. 
When Parkdale was closed in 1978, it had a minority student population of 85.62%. 
Three schools in central Topeka closed with relatively high minority populations .... 
Three schools with relatively low minority populations have been closed. . .. Three 
schools were closed when they had minority populations near the district average. 
Brown, 671 F. Supp at 1299. 
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Based on these conclusions, the district judge declared the Brown 
mandate satisfied.89 
Closure of the formerly all-black schools ended the equality in-
quiry. But their closure did not result in meaningful racial integration 
or equalization of educational opportunities for the poorest black chil-
dren. Like most post-Brown courts, the federal judge focused only on 
the existence of purposeful racial segregation and not on the persis-
tence of unequal educational resources allocated to schools with sub-
stantial numbers of black children, a legacy of de jure segregation. 
In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the 
district court ruling that Topeka had achieved a unitary system.90 The 
school district's failure to make significant efforts to eliminate racially 
identifiable schools effectively permitted continuation of a dual edu-
cational system.91 Once again the focus of the court was racial inte-
gration, not equalization of educational opportunities. The federal 
appellate court ruling, however, was vacated by the United States Su-
preme Court, which ordered the court of appeals to reconsider its de-
cision in light of two recent cases where judicial oversight was 
removed because the school districts made "good faith" efforts to end 
racial segregation.92 
Upon remand, the Tenth Circuit decided that neither case af-
fected its original ruling and reinstated its order saying "that because 
Topeka has not fulfilled its affirmative duty in the areas of student and 
faculty/staff assignments, the district court erred in concluding that the 
system as a whole had achieved unitary status. The district court must 
instead formulate an appropriate remedy."93 It took another decade 
before the federal courts were satisfied.94 
Around the same time that the appellate court was considering 
whether Topeka had achieved a unitary system, another case, Montoy 
v. State,95 was working its way through the Kansas courts. The focus 
of Montoy more directly addressed the concerns of black parents who 
still longed for equal educational opportunities for their children. 
89. Id. 
90. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989). 
91. Id. at 854. 
92. Bd. of Educ. v. Brown, 503 U.S. 978 (1992) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) 
(holding that the district court may withdraw its supervision over school desegregation plans in 
increments and retain judicial supervision only in those areas where the school district is not in 
compliance-transportation, physical facilities, and school assignments) and Bd. of Educ. of 
Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (holding that a court may order the 
dissolution of a desegregation decree if there has been good-faith compliance in terminating past 
discrimination) ). 
93. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 978 F.2d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 1992). 
94. Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Kan. 1999). 
95. Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555 (Kan. Dist. Ct., May 11, 2004). 
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IV. MEASURING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY PosT-BROWN 
A. Brown Recast: Montoy v. State and Educational Equity 
In 1949, at a time when the NAACP's school litigation efforts 
attacking "separate but equal" were becoming more successful, the 
State of Kansas committed itself to educational equality.96 In 1966, 
the State revised Article Six of the Kansas Constitution.97 The revi-
sion strengthened Kansas' historic commitment to public education; 
gave the responsibility for the maintenance of public schools to both 
the state legislature and the local school boards;98 and required the 
legislature to "make suitable provision for finance of the educational 
interests of the state."99 The State's unfulfilled constitutional and stat-
utory promise of educational equity stimulated litigation in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, which resulted in the enactment of the School District 
Equalization Act (SDEA).100 
Like most states, the wealth of individual Kansas school districts 
determined the amount of funding received by public schools. This 
funding system resulted in wide disparities in per pupil expenditures 
between school districts. lOl Charles Berger wrote that "the blurring of 
the goals of public education finance between educational equity, tax-
payer equity, adequacy, and local control of resources, hampered ef-
forts to achieve a sustainable and conceptually consistent system of 
finance. "102 
The SDEA was "[c]onceived as a way to dissociate educational 
opportunity and [school] district wealth .... "103 Under this act, the 
State provided each school district with monies for public education, 
and the districts had to contribute local funds amounting to 1.5% of 
the district's wealth - assessed valuation and taxable income.1°4 Dur-
96. Charles Berger, Equity Without Adjudication: Kansas School Finance Reform and the 
1992 School District Finance and Quality Performance Act, 27 J.L. & EDuc. 1,5 (1998). Kansas, 
however, had legislation mandating some state support of its public schools since the early twen-
tieth century. But by 1949 the state legislature explicitly added "equalization ... to state aid 
formulas." 1d. at 4-5. 
97. 1d. at 8. 
98. KAN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 2, 5. 
99. 1d. at § 6. 
100. Berger, supra note 96, at 3. School funding measures were considered during three 
periods when Kansas considered major educational reforms. The first period occurred in the 
1960s and was stimulated in part by a lawsuit, Tecumseh v. Throckmorton, 195 Kan. 144 (1965), 
filed by 148 school districts challenging a 1963 law requiring unification of school districts. The 
legislature enacted the 1965 School Foundation Act followed by a revamping of Article 6, the 
Education Article, of the 1966 Kansas Constitution. 1d. at 8. A second period of reform oc-
curred in the early 1970s prompted again by a lawsuit, Caldwell v. State, in which a state district 
court declared the state funding system unconstitutional because it made funding "dependent on [1 the wealth of the district in which the child resides." 1d. at 10-11 (quoting Caldwell, No. 50616 
(Kan. Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1972». 
101. [d. at 11. 
102. 1d. at 16. 
103. Id. at 13. 
104. Id. at 11. 
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ing the 1970s, two cases unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality 
of the SDEA, but by the late 1980s financial inequalities among the 
school districts worsened.105 A reappraisal of property state-wide in 
1989 significantly reduced the level of funding for education.106 
In 1991, a Kansas district court consolidated four lawsuits from 
forty-two school districts challenging the SDEA into Mock v. State.1°7 
Unlike the earlier cases, the plaintiffs in Mock were not concerned 
about the constitutionality of the SDEA; rather, they were worried 
about the shrinking state funds devoted to public education.lo8 But 
Kansas District Court Judge Terry Bullock quickly realized that the 
plaintiffs' complaints went to the way public schools were financed. lo9 
The key question was the nature of the state constitution's educational 
mandate and resulting legislative duty which the judge declared to be 
that "each child ... receive[s] ... [an] educational opportunity which 
is neither greater nor less than that of any other child."l1O Judge Bul-
lock's articulation of this legislative duty was grounded in two earlier 
Kansas Supreme Court cases.111 
Based on the stated legislative duty, Judge Bullock also con-
cluded that "[e]qual educational opportunity need not mean exact 
equality of dollar expenditures[,] ... sometimes equality of opportu-
nity may require unequal expenditures."112 The educational opportu-
nity provided, however, must be "suitable," as determined by the 
needs of the students.113 The SDEA formula was constitutionally de-
fective because it did not take these considerations into account. 
105. [d. at 15. The first challenge occurred in 1974 when taxpayers, individual students and 
forty-two school districts, challenged the constitutionality of SDEA in Knowles v. State Board of 
Education. 219 Kan. 271 (1976). "The district [court] judge allowed time for the legislature to 
respond before effectuating his order .... The 1975 amendments to the SDEA were designed to 
correct some of the irrationalities ... found in the 1973 act." Berger, supra note 96, at 14. The 
district court dismissed the case as moot, but the state supreme court overruled and remanded 
the case. [d. Seven years later the district court once again upheld the constitutionality of the 
SDEA and the parties did not appeal this ruling. [d. at 14 (citing Knowles v. Kansas, 77 CV 251 
(Kan.Dist. Ct., Jan. 26, 1981». 
106. [d. at 17. 
107. [d. at 16-17 (citing Mock v. State, No. 91-CV-1009 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Oct. 14, 1991». 
108. [d. 
109. [d. at 18. 
110. [d. at 20 (citing Mock, No. 91-CV-1009 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Oct. 14, 1991». 
111. In 1942 the Kansas Supreme Court said that "[t]he general theory of our educational 
system is that every child in the state, without regard to race, creed, or wealth, shall have the 
facilities for a free education." State v. Smith, 127 P.2d 518, 522 (Kan. 1942). In 1982 the state 
high court said in that "[t]he ultimate State purpose in offering a system of public schools is to 
provide an environment where quality education can be afforded equally to all." Provance v. 
Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 648 P.2d 710, 716 (Kan. 1982). 
112. Berger, supra note 96, at 20 (citing Mock, No. 91-CV-1009 (Kan. Dist. Ct, Oct. 14, 
1991». Judge Bullock cites, as examples, "students requiring transportation to school and stu-
dents speaking English as a second language ... [which] may require disproportionate expendi-
tures to ensure equal educational opportunity." [d. at 20 (citing Mock, No. 91-CV-1009 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct., Oct. 14, 1991». 
113. [d. at 20. 
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Following the Mock decision, the Kansas legislature enacted the 
1992 School District Finance and Quality Performance Act 
(SDFQPA), which mandated a uniform state-wide basic property tax 
and set a fixed budget for each district based on weighted enroll-
ment.114 Unlike the SDEA, the SDFQPA "start[ed] from a presump-
tion of equal dollar [per pupil] expenditures" but compensated for 
disparities between districts using six weighing factors.1 15 Satisfied 
with the result, Judge Bullock dismissed the case with the parties' mu-
tual consent.116 Nevertheless, the issue of unequal educational oppor-
tunity simply would not go away. 
More than a decade later, Judge Bullock made similar findings 
about the SDFQPA in Montoy v. State.117 But his ruling went even 
further, finding the school financing scheme unconstitutional.118 
Judge Bullock hoped that the legislature would act quickly to rectify 
the situation. The Kansas legislature, however, was unwilling and per-
haps financially unable to remedy the harm. The Kansas legislature 
played politics with public education, rejecting bill after bill due to 
presumed financial costs, burdens, and bi-partisanship.119 
In his December 2003 ruling, Judge Bullock gave the legislature a 
few more months to repair the state school financing scheme.12o 
When the 2004 legislative session closed with no changes, the frus-
trated judge wrote: 
[h]undreds of thousands of these children have gone through the 
Kansas educational system during this period of time. According to 
the evidence, many thousands of them have been permanently 
harmed by their inadequate educations and forever consigned to a 
lesser existence. Further delay will unquestionably harm more of 
these vulnerable and/or protected of our students.121 
114. 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 280. 
115. Berger, supra note 96, at 29. Those factors were transportation, vocational education, 
bilingual education, at-risk pupils, low enrollment, and school facilities. Id. 
116. Id. at 28. 
117. Montoy v. Kansas, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, (Kan. Dist. Ct., May 11, 2004). 
118. Judge Bullock wrote that the scheme: 
A. [flailed to equitably distribute resources among children equally entitled by the 
Constitution to a suitable education, or in the alternative, to provide a rational basis 
premised in differing costs for any differential; 
B. [flailed to supply adequate total resources to provide all Kansas children with a 
suitable education (as that term was previously defined by both this Court and the 
Legislature itself); and 
C. [dlramatically and adversely impacted the learning and educational performance of 
the most vulnerable and/or protected Kansas children. This disparate impact occurred 
by virtue of underfunding, generally, and selective underfunding of the schools where 
these vulnerable and/or protected children primarily attend. specifically. Those vulner-
able and/or protected children, of course, were and are: the poor, the minorities, the 
physically and mentally disadvantaged, and those who cannot or nearly cannot yet 
speak the primary language of America and its schools. 
!d. at 1. 
119. Note the legislative history set out by Judge Bullock. Montoy, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 
1094555, (Kan. Dist. Ct., May 11, 2004) at *3-5. 
120. Id. at *1. 
121. Id. at *5. 
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In essence, students who needed the most funding aid were getting the 
least and being blatantly neglected by the legislative and executive 
branches. These failings are quite similar to the complaints advanced 
by educational advocates like Gary Orfield and others about the cur-
rent status of non-white children educated nationwide in highly segre-
gated urban public schools.122 
In measuring equality, Judge Bullock once again remarked that 
the equal educational opportunity requirement is not satisfied merely 
by spending equal amounts of money on each student.123 He wrote: 
"some children are more expensive to educate than others (especially 
the poor or at-risk; the physically and mentally disabled; racial minori-
ties; and those who cannot or are limited in their ability to speak En-
glish)."124 Yet Judge Bullock's ruling did not give parents, lawyers, 
legislators, and educators a clear picture of how to measure educa-
tional equality. 
B. Integration without Equality: Hobson v. Hansen 
Derrick Bell and a few others argue that black American students 
do not need to attend school with white children to receive a good 
education.125 Given the racial composition of most large cities in this 
nation, racial integration, if it means white majority schools, is unat-
tainable. Some of our largest cities have overwhelmingly non-white 
public school populations.126 In many of these same cities a substan-
tial majority of residents are non-white, so even if white children re-
turned to those public schools, highly segregated schools would still 
exist.127 Since the United States Supreme Court in Milliken v. Brad-
ley128 restricted transporting students across school district lines to 
122. See generally supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. 
123. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
124. Montoy, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, at *12 (Kan. Dist. Ct., May 11, 2004). 
125. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 12, at 165-66. "Simply placing black children in 
'white' schools will seldom suffice." Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 12, at 514. "Desegre-
gation plans can never yield the instructional gains to which black children are entitled .... 
Demographic desegregation must take a backseat to instructional reform or we will remain frus-
trated by a continuing and widening gap between white and black pupil performance in desegre-
gated schools." Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education For Minority Pupils: Brown 
Confounded or Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 18, at 121. 
Many advocates of nonpublic schools serving urban black children maintain that 
Brown's integrative mandate is essentially assimilative. Black students are sent to 
white schools where teaching, curricula, and conceptions of merit express the homoge-
neity of their history. Because little attention is given to multiracial, multicultural, or 
multiclass issues, black students often feel their school environment is alien to their 
experience. This institutional closed-mindedness makes inclusion as stigmatizing as 
exclusion. 
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 12, at 165-66. 
126. As of 2000, between 85% and 90% of the students in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, 
Miami-Dade, and Houston-the five largest central-city school districts-were minorities. 
CASHIN, supra note 16, at 219. 
127. See Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 34 tbl.18. 
128. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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achieve racial balance,129 we are faced with determining how to 
achieve educational equality for poor, predominately non-white pub-
lic school students. This was the issue facing the federal district court 
in Hobson v. Hansen.13o 
Thirteen years after Brown, black and poor students sued the Su-
perintendent of Schools and the members of the Board of Education 
in the District of Columbia to determine whether the District's public 
schools were in compliance with the mandate announced by the 
United States Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe,131 the companion 
case to Brown.132 At the time, black Americans constituted 60% of 
the city's population and 90% of the public school population.133 
J. Skelly Wright, a federal circuit judge sitting as district judge in 
Hobson,134 found that "the school administration's response to the 
fact and dilemma of segregation has been primarily characterized ... 
by indifference and inaction."135 Not only had school officials not 
taken any serious steps to correct de facto segregation, Judge Wright 
found that post-Brown school policies actually encouraged segrega-
tion.l36 Specifically, the court found continuing segregation of school 
129. [d. Further, I am not advocating that racial integration be achieved by bussing students 
across district lines. 
130. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). 
131. 344 U.S. 873 (1952). 
132. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 405. 
133. [d. at 406. 
134. At that time, the law required federal district judges in the District of Columbia to 
appoint the members of the Board of Education. Consequently, since the school board mem-
bers were defendants in the case, the local federal judges could not sit because of potential 
conflicts of interest. Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniver-
sary of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 588 n.237 (2002) (citing 
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J. 
SKELLY WRIGHT 57 (1984)). Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit assigned Judge Wright to the case because of his experience "as 
district judge superintending school desegregation in New Orleans." [d. His leadership in en-
forcing the Brown mandate in New Orleans was a reason President Kennedy appointed Judge 
Wright to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit bench. 
"Judge Wright was not a popular figure in the Fifth Circuit, and many in that community were 
pleased to see him move to Washington." [d. at 563 n.66 (citing J.W. PELTASON, FIFTy-EIGHT 
LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 221-29 (1971)). 
[d. 
135. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 414. The trial judge continued: 
School officials have refused to install actual integration as an objective for administra-
tion policy, or even to recognize that in the District segregation is a major problem. 
Over the years they have expressed little interest in and done nothing about locating 
schools on the borders of white and [black] communities, or busing students from east 
of the Park into the underutilized schools west of that divide to achieve integration, or 
building schools in the Park accessible from east and west alike. . . . Many of these 
ideas, indeed, have apparently never been considered. 
136. [d. at 415-16. 
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personneP37 in the teacher placement policies138 and in the placement 
of principals.139 
The court also found glaring inequalities in the distribution of ed-
ucational resources. It looked at the age of school buildings, their 
physical condition and educational adequacy; the number of library 
books, librarians, and the existence and quality of school libraries; the 
degree of school congestion; the quality of faculty; and considered 
factors like teacher experience, the use of temporary teachers, text-
books and supplies, and per pupil expenditures.14o Judge Wright con-
cluded that school administrators were indifferent about these 
inequalities.141 
As a result, he wrote that where de facto segregation exists due to 
factors beyond the control of school administrators, a "separate but 
equal" Plessy-like rule applies and the District violated this rule.142 
Under Judge Wright's reasoning, de facto segregation in public 
schools is especially harmful if it results in unequal educational oppor-
tunities for non-white and poor students. 
His reasoning seems more an extension of Sweatt v. Painter than 
the implementation of Brown, although Robert Carter wrote that 
"Brown surely must require the abandonment of all state educational 
policies and practices that result in a disparate allocation of public 
educational resources between blacks and whites. "143 Clearly the 
Sweatt decision influenced how Judge Wright went about determining 
Id. 
137. Id. at 425. The judge wrote that 
a significant if not startling degree of teachers and principals have been assigned to 
schools where their own race mirrors the racial composition of the schools' student 
bodies. In a nutshell, white schools are usually paired with white faculties, [black] 
schools with [black] faculties; and integrated schools have integrated faculties. 
138. Id. at 426. 
The Board's policies thus plainly entailed the entrenchment and perpetuation of the 
teacher segregation of the past with a minimum of change. The court finds that at least 
a part of today's segregation is attributable to the Board's 1954 failure to shuffle facul-
ties and thereby undo the [de jure] segregation which had theretofore been the rule. 
Id. "In short, defendants have not shown that policies and practices free of racial criteria have 
been responsible for the patterns of teacher segregation in the District .... " Id. at 429. 
139. Id. "Testimony at trial verified that none of the white elementary schools in the North-
west has had a [black] principal at any time since desegregation." Id. 
140. Id. at 431-38. The trial court also examined the student "ability-based" tracking system. 
The school officials initiated the tracking system as "a response to problems created by the sud-
den commingling of numerous educationally retarded [black] students with the better educated 
white students." Id. at 442. The trial judge concluded, however, that the system's policy of 
"ability grouping as presently practiced ... is a denial of equal educational opportunity to the 
poor and a majority of the [blacks], a denial that contravenes not only the guarantees of the Fifth 
Amendment but also the fundamental premise of the track system itself." Id. at 443. 
141. Id. at 441-42. 
142. Id. at 494. One commentator wrote: "By applying the Plessy v. Ferguson aphorism, 
'separate but equal,' the court discovers violations of equal protection in the inferiority of the 
predominantly Negro schools." Pamela K. Quinn, Hobson v Hansen: A Substantial Step in the 
Evolution of the Equal Educational Opportunity of Equal Protection, 29 U. PnT. L. REV. 149, 
154 (1967-1968). 
143. Robinson, supra note 10, at 14 n.67 (quoting Carter, supra note 62, at 622). 
2004] Reconstructing Brown's Promise 53 
what constitutes equal educational opportunities.144 Even the court's 
discussion in Hobson of why an integrated education is valued mirrors 
the Supreme Court's language in Sweatt: 
The Court finds that actual integration of students and faculty at a 
school, by setting the stage for meaningful and continuous ex-
changes between the races, educates white and Negro students 
equally in the fundamentals of racial tolerance and 
understanding. 145 
The Court in Sweatt v. Painter stated: 
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, 
cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions 
with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has 
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, re-
moved from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with 
which the law is concerned.146 
Judge Wright's discussion about the value of racially integrated 
public schools also is roughly analogous to the justification for integra-
tion being advanced today by education scholars like Gary Orfield. In 
Hobson, Judge Wright wrote that 
[r]acially and socially homogeneous schools damage the minds and 
spirit of all children who attend them-the [black], the white, the 
poor and the affluent -and block the attainment of the broader 
goals of democratic education, whether the segregation occurs by 
law or by fact .... [Further t]he scholastic achievement of the dis-
advantaged child, [black] and white, is strongly related to the racial 
and socioeconomic composition of the student body of his school. 
A racially and socially integrated school environment increases the 
scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged child of whatever 
race."147 
Significantly, in Hobson Judge Wright extended the reasoning of 
Brown to encompass educational inequities due to socioeconomic 
class. Thus it is not simply racial isolation mandated by law that con-
tributes to educational inequities, rather, similar inequities exist where 
affluent families, particularly white families, are absent from public 
schools.148 Given these conclusions, a simplistic approach would be to 
144. The Court in Sweatt similarly found that the separate law schools at the University of 
Texas for blacks and whites were clearly unequal. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 
(1950). 
Id. 
145. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 419. 
146. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634. 
147. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 406. 
148. Id. at 410. Judge Wright noted: 
Washington's white families ... are increasingly few in number; further their residences 
are heavily concentrated in one area of the city, the area west of Rock Creek Park .... 
The Park is a verdant curtain which draws through the city. It has long been true that 
virtually every residence west of the Park is white. . .. [EJast of the Park the city is very 
heavily Negro. Twenty-seven years ago whites constituted at least a one-third minority 
in every neighborhood in the city. But the rapid white out-migration from Washington 
into the Virginia and Maryland suburbs ever since 1948, the year of peak white popula-
tion, has evidently depleted the supply of whites in many areas. 
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place poor children in schools with affluent white majorities. But 
Judge Wright's findings in Hobson also illustrate how attending the 
same school as affluent whites is not always a guarantee of equal edu-
cational opportunity.149 
Segregation existed within the District's integrated but majority 
white schools due to the tracking system adopted by the school board 
shortly after the Bolling decision.150 Judge Wright, like Professor 
Robinson, concluded that the tracking system perpetuates the evils of 
de jure racial segregation.151 Recently, a sociologist who studied pub-
lic schools in North Carolina found "[s]ome of the most widespread 
and harmful sources of racially disparate educational processes and 
outcomes are racially segregated schools and classrooms segregated 
by tracking. "152 She concluded that using socioeconomic diversity in 
school assignment is "a promising strategy [that] ... do[es] not employ 
racial prescriptions or sacrifice excellence on the altar of equality."153 
But few urban school systems have substantial affluent student popu-
lations, a point I address in the next section. Further, her suggestion 
does not address the evils caused by tracking within racially integrated 
schools that result from biased assignment criteria and earlier unequal 
educational opportunities. 
V. EQUALLY FUNDED AND RACIALLY INTEGRATED EDUCATION 
As RECONCILABLE GOALS 
A. Resegregation and Decline in Educational Quality 
Much post-Brown scholarship has been devoted to how meaning-
ful integration was thwarted for two reasons. First, white parents fled 
the cities for white suburban enclaves fearing that their children 
would receive an inferior education in racially integrated public 
schools.154 Similarly, white parents in deep southern states with sub-
149. The District of Columbia school system used a four-part tracking system that divided 
students into "Honors," "College Prep," "General," and "Basic" based ability. Id. at 406-07. 
Judge Wright found that "[o]nly a small number of predominately Negro elementary schools 
offer the Honors 'Track,' the highest rung in the school system's track system of ability grouping. 
By contrast, virtually all of the predominately white elementary schools have Honors Tracks." 
Id. at 439. Further he concluded that the aptitude test used to determine a student's track was 
inappropriate "since these tests do not relate to the Negro and disadvantaged child, track assign-
ment based on such tests relegates Negro and disadvantaged children to the lower tracks from 
which, because of the reduced curricula and. the absence of adequate remedial and compensa-
tory education, as well as continued inappropriate testing, the chance of escape is remote." Id. 
at 407. For a discussion of the use of tracking post-Brown, see Angelia Dickens, Revisiting 
Brown v. Board of Education: How Tracking Has Resegregated America's Public Schools, 29 
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 469 (1996). 
150. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 442-43. 
151. Id. at 515. See Professor Robinson's discussion of tracking as means of resegregation. 
Robinson, supra note 10, at 15-16. 
152. Mickelson, supra note 1, at 1481. 
153. Id. 
154. Diane Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of Meanings, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 
18, at 38-39. 
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stantial black minorities placed their children in private segregationist 
academies leaving virtually all-black public school districts.155 Second, 
the Supreme Court refused to read Brown as mandating racial inte-
gration across school district lines.156 Some scholarship also exists 
describing the decline in the quality of education generally in public 
schools across the nation and offering suggestions for educational 
reforms.157 
Yet the support by black parents in large urban areas for school 
vouchers surprised many public school proponents.158 The continuing 
concern of these parents is not whether their children are attending 
racially integrated schools, but rather whether their children are re-
ceiving a quality education.159 Education scholar Jeannie Oakes suc-
cinctly states the problem: 
155. "In November 1952, South Carolina voters approved a constitutional amendment elimi-
nating the state's duty to educate all children, thus allowing conversion to a private school sys-
tem to avoid racial desegregation. The governors of Mississippi and Virginia considered 
submitting similar proposals in 1953. Following the Supreme Court[ 1 ... decision in 1954, states 
across the south passed tuition grant programs .... " Molly Townes O'Brien, Private School 
Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 385 (1997). "In 
Prince Edward County, Virginia, where white intransigence had been so strong that the public 
schools were closed entirely from 1959 to 1964, most white schoolchildren - about 1,000 of them 
- were attending the private white academy while 1,728 black youngsters went to the public 
schools," preferring to abandon the public schools rather than desegregate. RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE 778 (1977). See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESIS· 
TANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's 67-81 (1969). 
156. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that the white/suburban school 
districts of Detroit did not have to be included in a desegregation plan unless the white/suburban 
school districts were actively discriminating against minority students). 
157. See generally Suzanne Hansen, School Vouchers: The Answer to a Failing Public School 
System, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 73 (2001); Jo Ann Bodemer, School Choice Through 
Vouchers: Drawing Constitutional Lemon-Aid From the Lemon Test, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273 
(1996); Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education For Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or 
Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 18, at 109-23. 
158. "In a 1997 survey, sixty-two percent of blacks supported vouchers compared with forty-
nine percent of the total population." Thomas C. Berg, Race Relations and Modern Church-State 
Relations, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1009, 1024 n.99 (2002) (citing LOWELL C. ROSE ET AL., THE 29TH 
ANNUAL PHI DELTA KAPPA GALLUP POLL OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD 
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 48-49 (1997». "In another, fifty-seven percent of blacks supported 
vouchers compared with forty-seven percent of whites." Id. (citing JOSEPH P. VITERnTI, CHOOS-
ING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 5-6 & nn.14-16 (1999) 
(citing DAVID BOSITIS, 1997 NATIONAL OPINION POLL-CHILDREN'S ISSUES 7 
(Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 1997))). 
See generally Michael Leo Owens, Why Blacks Support Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, 
at A2; Sare Horwitz, Poll Finds Backing for D.C. School Vouchers; Blacks Support Idea More 
Than Whites, WASHINGTON POST, May 23, 1998, at F01; James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause 
of Vouchers for Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1997, at AI. "A 1998 national survey of black 
parents reported a 'distinctive lack of energy and passion for integration' and found that eighty-
two percent preferred schools to focus on achievement instead." Berg, supra at 1028 (citing 
PUBLIC AGENDA FOUNDATION, TIME TO MOVE ON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND WHITE PARENTS 
SET AN AGENDA FOR PuBLIC SCHOOLS 11, 26 (1998), quoted in VITERITTI, supra at 33 & n.60.) 
159. A 1998 study conducted by Public Agenda and the Public Education Network found 
that 82% of black parents and 87% of white parents cited raising academic standards as more of 
a priority than racial integration of public schools. Only 9% of black parents and 5% of white 
parents cited racial integration as a top priority. PUBLIC AGENDA, TIME TO MOVE ON (1998), 
http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/moveon/moveon1d.htm. (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). Indi-
vidual accounts support these statistics. '''Let's focus on what children need and their parents' 
desire for them,' said Kaleem Caire, immediate past president of the Black Alliance for Educa-
tional Options. 'We think that's more important than desegregation for black children.'" Kim 
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What happened to educational equality? Perhaps, in the decades 
following Brown v. Board of Education we were nai've enough to 
think that wanting schools to make things right was enough. . .. In 
all our searching, we almost entirely overlooked the possibility that 
what happens within schools might contribute to unequal educa-
tional opportunities and outcomes. We neglected to examine the 
content and processes of school itself for the ways they may contrib-
ute to school failure.160 
Since most school districts continue to rely disproportionately on 
property taxes for funding,161 school districts with the least affluent 
families get less money than those with the most affluent families. 
Large urban school districts with weak property tax bases cannot pro-
vide the same level of funding as more affluent suburban districts. 
The result is the same type of inequality in educational expenditure 
experienced by black de jure racially segregated schools, a point Pro-
fessor Robinson addresses.162 
Today, faulty state-wide funding formulas are more directly re-
lated to unequal educational opportunities than to the lack of racial 
integration. Yet we know from history that the two issues are related. 
This is why some civil rights advocates still support putting black chil-
dren where the money is-with white children. 
An important caveat is warranted here, the more recent flight 
from inner city public schools by middle-class and affluent blacks has 
not resulted in substantially improved educational opportunities for 
their children.163 Since school funding is still tied to property taxes, 
and homes in black neighborhoods are generally assessed at lower 
rates than comparable homes in white neighborhoods,164 public 
schools in more affluent black suburban neighborhoods remain under-
Cobb, After Desegregation; Not about Color Now; Cleveland is Heavily into Tuition Vouchers, 
But Whether They Improve Education is Debatable, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 3, 2002, at 
A9. "'I'm not speaking for any of the other parents in the voucher program, but when I search 
for schools, I look for a school that would academically give my children what they needed,' said 
Kitchen, who is black. 'And secondly, I do look for diversity.''' Id. "Increased black representa-
tion in urban public education has had positive symbolic effects .... Nevertheless, ... [t]he 
educational achievement of black children and the overall quality of urban public schools have 
failed to improve significantly." Owens, supra note 159, at A2. 
160. Robinson, supra note 10, at 16 n.78 (quoting JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How 
SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUITY xiii-xiv (1985). 
161. Carter, supra note 66, at 888. 
162. Robinson, supra note 10, at 17-18. 
163. For example, starting in the 1970s, many black families fled Washington, D.C. and set-
tled in suburban Prince George's County, Maryland. By 2000, blacks constituted 62.7% of that 
county's population. U.S. Census Bureau, Maryland Quick Facts, Prince George's County 
(2000), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24/24033.html (last revised July 9, 2004). The me-
dian household income for Prince George's County is $55,256 whereas the median household 
income for the state of Maryland is $52,868. Id. The median household income in Mitchellville, 
an affluent black community in Prince George's County, is $85,000. CASHIN, supra note 16, at 
128. Another middle-class haven is the older community of Fort Washington in the southern 
part of the county. Id. at 129. According to the most recent census data, Fort Washington is 
two-thirds black with a median income of $81,000. Id. at 130. 
164. See CASHIN, supra note 16, at 135-36. 
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funded compared to their white counterparts.165 Thus we need to un-
couple the two related goals-racial integration and equal funding-
because the old integrationist rationale does not ensure meaningful 
educational equality for blacks, Latinos, and poor whites. 
Once more, the United States Supreme Court by a bare majority 
thwarted early efforts to achieve equity in the funding of education. 
The Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez166 refused, de-
spite dicta in several cases emphasizing the importance of educa-
tion,167 to recognize public education as a fundamental right for all, 
precluding any consideration of whether the Constitution requires all 
children to be educated on an equal basis.168 Notwithstanding the 
Rodriguez precedent, I contend that a new battle must be waged for 
recognition of education as a fundamental right under the Constitu-
tion. This right would consist of two components, a guarantee of 
equality in school financing and a guarantee of a racially, culturally, 
and ethnically diverse learning environment. Given the composition 
of the current Court, many readers may question the rationality of this 
suggestion, but remember the lawyers who successfully litigated the 
series of decisions leading to Brown faced similar circumstances. 
Another alternative would be a constitutional amendment guar-
anteeing basic education. The South Africa Constitution contains an 
affirmative right to basic education.169 Unlike the United States, the 
national government in South Africa has the primary responsibility 
165. See, e.g., id. at 145-47. 
166. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
167. In Brown a unanimous Supreme Court wrote: "[e]ducation is perhaps the most impor-
tant function of state and local governments. . .. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such 
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). "Americans 
regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic 
system of government." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). "The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participa-
tion as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been 
recognized by our decisions." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979). "Education provides 
the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us 
all[;] ... education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot 
ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means 
to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
221 (1982). "The diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher 
education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity . . . . Effective 
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential 
if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331-
32 (2003). 
168. The Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), 
upheld the constitutionality of Texas' school financing scheme ruling that differences in educa-
tional funding based on wealth does not trigger strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
169. S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, 29 (l)(a). See generally Alfreda Sellers Diamond, Constitutional 
Comparisons and Converging Histories: Historical Development in Equal Educational Opportu-
nity Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New South Africa 
Constitution, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 853 (1999). 
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for funding public education;170 and unlike South Africa the United 
States Constitution contains no positive rights. To be effective, a con-
stitutional amendment guaranteeing a right to basic education must 
create an affirmative right to an equal basic education. Further, since 
state and local governments are the primary funding sources for pub-
lic education in this country, a constitutional amendment should direct 
the states to provide equal basic public education to all residents. 
Since a federal constitutional amendment is unlikely in the near fu-
ture, state courts remain the best arena to push for educational 
equality. 
B. Achieving Equal Funding for Education 
Most recent success in achieving some level of financial educa-
tional equality has come in state courts where a state constitution 
guarantees free public education.l7l Like Judge Bullock in Kansas, a 
few state judges seem willing to require some form of educational 
equality and are able to measure what constitutes equality while re-
maining mindful of financial constraints placed on state legislatures.172 
Increasing numbers of states are rethinking how to fund public educa-
tion more equitablyY3 Perhaps the time is ripe to develop a strategic 
plan for raising this issue again in the United States Supreme Court. 
170. Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimination, 9 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 31, 41-42 (2003) (arguing against the user-fee system). 
171. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); McDuffy 
v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Columbia Falls v. Mon-
tana, No. BDV-2002-528, 2004 WL 844055 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. Ct., April 15, 2004); Abbott 
v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2001); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.c. 1999); State v. Camp-
bell County Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001). But cf Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 
1997). Courts in three states struck down state school financing schemes based on state constitu-
tional grounds: Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). For further discussion of school finance litigation, see Kent K. Anker, 
Differences and Dialogue: School Finance in New York State, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
345 (1998); Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Educa-
tion Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 607 (1999); Jennifer L. Fogle, Abbeville County School 
District v. State: The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education in South Carolina, 51 S.c. L. REV. 
420 (2000); David R. Matthews, Lessons from Lake View: Some Questions and Answers from 
Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 56 ARK. L. REV. 519 (2003); Joseph S. Patt, 
School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in Attitudes, 34 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. 
REV. 547 (1999); Troy Reynolds, Education Finance Reform Litigation and Separation of Powers: 
Kentucky Makes its Contribution, 80 Ky. LJ. 309 (1991-1992); Karen Swenson, School Finance 
Reform Litigation: Why are some State Supreme Courts Activist and Others Restrained?, 63 ALB. 
L. REV. 1147 (2000); Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing 
Saga of Equal Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to 
School Finance Systems, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 499 (2004); R. Craig Wood, Constitutional 
Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas: Moving from Equity to Adequacy, 
23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 531 (2004). 
172. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 91 S.W.3d 472; Columbia Falls, No. BDV-2002-5228, 
2004 WL 844055; Abbott, 710 A.2d 450. 
173. See supra note 158. "In over twenty-four states, parents and coalitions of property-poor 
school districts have launched challenges to state education financing systems alleging that dis-
parities in expenditure per pupil between low-wealth districts and high-wealth districts violate 
their state constitution's equal protection and education clauses. Arkansas, California, Connecti-
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A close reading of the plaintiffs' argument in San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriquez discloses that the harm alleged is based not 
solely on socio-economic status, but implicitly racialized status as well. 
The majority opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell begins: 
[t]his suit attacking the Texas system of financing public education 
was initiated by Mexican-American parents whose children attend 
the elementary and secondary schools ... [as] a class action on be-
half of school children throughout the State who are members of 
minority groups or who are poor and reside in school districts hav-
ing a low property tax base."174 
Race, in its broadest sense, was the elephant in the courtroom.175 
The Plaintiffs, characterized as poor and Mexican-American, seemed 
to be arguing that state educational funding determinations based on 
wealth not only impair a fundamental right, but also are suspect under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when 
these decisions disproportionately impact racialized groups. Prior to 
Brown, Texas law only authorized separate schools for whites and 
blacksp6 The state never formally segregated Mexicans or Mexican-
Americans in public schools,177 even though they experienced discrim-
ination in other areas like public accommodations178 and housing.179 
Further, Texas law classified Mexicans and Mexican-Americans as 
white,180 so the plaintiffs were precluded from alleging race-based dis-
crimination in education. 
The three judge district court in a per curiam opinion declared 
the Texas school financing scheme unconstitutional.181 In concluding 
that education was a fundamental right, the court relied on a recent 
ruling by the California Supreme Court182 and the language of the 
cut, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming have 
struck down financing schemes where the funding differences are due to unequal property tax 
bases or unequal demands on local revenue." Carter, Public School Desegregation, supra note 
66, at 893-94. 
174. Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added). 
175. Although Justice Thurgood Marshall in his dissent in Rodriguez never mentions race as 
a factor, he cites, in addition to Brown, three of the old favorably decided NAACP United States 
Supreme Court separate but equal cases, Missouri ex reI. Gaines, McLaurin, and Sweatt. Id. at 
84-85. Marshall also cites Hobson v. Hansen and two other post-Brown race cases, Griffin v. 
County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964), and McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). Id. at 86, 92. 
176. George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican Ameri-
can Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 555, 574-75 n.95 (1994) (detailing 
desegregation efforts of Mexican-Americans since 1930). 
177. This did not mean that individual districts did not discriminate. Id. at 574-75 (discussing 
Independent School District v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), allowing a school 
for Mexicans/Mexican-Americans for linguistic and other reasons). 
178. Id. at 563-65 (citing Terrell Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez, 182 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1944) (discussing discrimination in public swimming pools». 
179. Id. at 569 (citing Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (refusing to 
enforce restrictive covenant». 
180. Id. at 575 n.95. (citing language from Indep. Sch. Dist., 33 S.W.2d 790.) 
181. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971). 
182. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
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United States Supreme Court in Brown.183 With the race component 
effectively thwarted, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court in Rod-
riguez, left with only the wealth discrimination claim, ruled in favor of 
the state. 
The narrowly divided Court knew that the states were smarting 
from Brown mandated federal court interference with local control of 
public schools. The amicus briefs filed by thirty states, including Kan-
sas, on behalf of the State of Texas reflected these serious federalism 
concerns.184 But as the Montoy decision suggests, attitudes have 
changed in some of these states since the early 1970s. 
C. The Value of a Truly Racially Integrated Education 
As the previous sections suggest, experts are still divided about 
whether racially integrated schools are the remedy for educational in-
equality. This section briefly explores whether there are other reasons 
to press for racially integrated schools. I have always been troubled 
by a sentence in Brown that reads: "To separate [black school chil-
dren] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of 
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone."185 What the Court did not say, but what seems 
equally true, is that racially segregated schools harm white children 
too, especially in a society where they are unlikely to encounter their 
non-white racial counterparts in everyday life.186 
183. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 281, 283. The court also cited Hobson v. Hansen. Id. at 284. 
The equality claims of the plaintiffs in Rodriguez were rather modest. They asked only for "fis-
cal neutrality ... that the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth, other than 
the wealth of the state as a whole." Id. Justice Thurgood Marshall, dissenting in the United 
States Supreme Court case, noted that 
[t)he District Court ... postponed decision for some two years in the hope that the 
Texas Legislature would remedy the gross disparities in treatment inherent in the Texas 
financing scheme ... only after the legislature failed to act in its 1971 Regular Session 
... the District Court, apparently recognizing the lack of hope for self-initiated legisla-
tive reform, rendered its decision. The strong vested interest of property-rich districts 
in the existing property tax scheme poses a substantial barrier to self-initiated legisla-
tive reform in educational financing. 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,71 n.2. (Marshall, J. dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted). 
184. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 57 n.11l. 
185. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
186. John Payton argued before the Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger: 
Michigan is a very segregated state. . .. The University's entering students come from 
these settings and have rarely had experiences across racial or ethnic lines. That's true 
for our white students. It's true for our minority students. They've not lived together. 
They've not played together. They've certainly not gone to school together. The result 
is often that these students come to college not knowing about individuals of different 
races and ethnicities. And often not even being aware of the full extent of their lack of 
knowledge. This gap allows stereotypes to come into existence. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), available in 
2003 WL 1728816, at *28 (Apr. 1,2003) (argument on behalf of Respondents). 
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Racial segregation laws and practices harmed all segments of 
American society, even though whites benefited politically and eco-
nomically during the period. The harm of racial segregation man-
dated by law cuts both ways. United States Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter, noted how: 
"numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes [better] 
learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as 
professionals.' "187 
The study that most impressed the Court was done by the United 
States Military which integrated its forces well before Brown.188 Lieu-
tenant General Julius Becton, Jr. and other retired military personnel 
argued in their amicus brief that, presently, "no alternative exists to 
limited, race-conscious programs to increase the pool of high quality 
minority officer candidates and to establish diverse educational set-
tings for officers,"189 and that "[t]he military must both maintain se-
lectivity in admissions and train and educate a racially diverse officer 
corps to command racially diverse troops."190 Orfield and Lee also 
remind us that: 
[w]hites are becoming minorities in some major parts of the country 
and may be increasingly willing to admit that they need what can 
only be learned in desegregated institutions - how to function very 
effectively in a society where they must understand and work with 
those of other racial and ethnic backgrounds.191 
So, today, unlike America in the 1950s, the courts and others 
openly admit that integrated educational experiences are in the best 
interests of whites. This argument needs to be advanced with more 
force until Americans believe it is true. This may be difficult. Even 
though the country mouths a belief in racially integrated education, 
evidence over the past fifty years suggests that many whites still be-
lieve in black inferiority and resist placing their children in racially 
integrated schools when whites are not a substantial majority. Thus, 
black children who attend integrated high performing public schools 
remain in the minority, reinforcing in the minds of both black and 
white students the notion of black intellectual inferiority and black 
exceptionalism. 
While I agree with Professor Robinson that ideally racial integra-
tion is a laudable goal, especially in a racially pluralistic democracy 
like the United States, I still wonder whether the damage black chil-
187. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
188. See Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 10-17, Grutter, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003) (No. 02-241), Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516). 
189. [d. at 9. 
190. [d. 
191. Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 41. 
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dren consigned to de jure racially segregated schools suffered is repli-
cated today when they attend high achieving schools with low non-
white populations. As long as blacks and Latinos are seen as intellec-
tually inferior second-class citizens, white Americans will continue to 
doubt that sustained interactions with non-whites in school settings 
benefit them. Squarely addressing the equal funding issue that dispro-
portionately impacts black children is one component of an overall 
program to make black and Latino children more competitive and 
better educated.192 As black and Latino children become more com-
petitive, arguments suggesting perceived intellectual inferiority will be 
harder to advance. 
VI. CONCLUSION: BROWN, FAILED CASE AND IcON RECONCILED 
Today the struggle for equality in education is different from the 
1954 struggle due in part to the increased presence of Latinos along 
with African-Americans in educationally substandard public 
schools.193 Fifty years after Brown, the vast majority of white school-
aged children living in a far more racially diverse America still have 
little or no contact with non-white students.194 Further, the composi-
tion of the current United States Supreme Court is radically different 
192. See generally CASHIN, supra note 16, at 228 (stating that malnutrition, poor health care, 
lack of parental involvement, frequent changes of residence, exposure to violence, and drug use 
contributes to the burgeoning achievement gap); Kati Haycock, Closing the Achievement Gap, 
EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Vol. 58, Issue 6, Mar. 2001, at 6 (lack of standards, lack of challenging 
curriculum, need for additional help for students, and differences in teacher quality increase the 
achievement gap); Erik W. Robelen, Taking on the Achievement Gap, Prepared for the North 
Central Regional Educational Laboratory (June 2002), www.ncrel.org/gap/takeon/toc.htm (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2004) (stating that unequal expectations, differences in financial resources, and 
differences in teacher quality all contribute to the achievement gap). 
Robert Carter acknowledged that "[e]qualized funding by itself will not lead to higher 
achievement in inner-city schools, for at the core quality education comes about by human inter-
action. We need to change human behavior, and how instruction at inner-city schools is organ-
ized." Carter, supra note 66, at 894. He cites as a positive example the reaction of the Kentucky 
legislature to a state supreme court ruling, Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 
186 (Ky. 1989), declaring the state funding system unconstitutional. In response "the Kentucky 
state legislature passed legislation not only to equalize funding, but to create an entirely new 
school system with upgraded teacher quality, new management techniques and expanded pre-
school programs. The Kentucky Supreme Court was able to provide the legislature with the 
legitimacy to make these changes that might otherwise have been politically impossible." Id. 
193. "The percent of Latino students in predominately minority schools in the West has al-
most doubled from 42 percent in 1968 to 80 percent in 2001 .... " Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 
20. In Maryland 23.2% of Latino students attend highly segregated and substandard minority 
schools. ld. at 28. For a discussion of this point, see Kristi L. Bowman, Note, The New Face of 
School Desegregation, 50 DUKE L. J. 1751 (2001). 
194. "In the twenty most segregated large [school] districts, the average white exposure to 
blacks is about 12%. This means that the average white student in these districts attends schools 
with less than 12% blacks, indicating highly segregated schools for white students. Five of these 
districts are among the 40 largest school districts." Erica Frankenberg and Chungmei Lee, Race 
In American Public Schools: Rapidly Resegregating School Districts, HARVARD UNIV. CIVIL 
RIGHTS PROJECTS 14 (2002), http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseglRace_in_ 
American_Public_Schoolsl.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2004). "The average white child attends a 
school that is 78.1 % white." John R. Logan, Choosing Segregation: Raciallmbalance in Ameri-
can's Public Schools, 1990-20002 (2002), http://mumfordl.dyndns.orglcen2000/SchooIPop/SPRe-
port/SPDownload.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
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from the Court that decided Brown. Today we live in a country with a 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William Rehnquist, "who ... con-
sistently opposed school desegregation195 and [with] an Attorney 
General, John Ashcroft, who made much of his political career in Mis-
souri attacking the federal courts' efforts to desegregate ... " that 
state's schools.196 Thus, social scientists Orfield and Lee write: "[t]he 
immediate question is about the possibility of progress in a society 
with huge minority populations, massive segregation, a court system 
that has dismantled critically important policy tools, and a public that 
supports desegregation but has no consensus about how to get it. "197 
Robert Carter states the problem in even starker terms: 
The need to ensure equal educational opportunities for African-
Americans is even more important now than when [Brown] was de-
cided in 1954. In today's economy, education is a prerequisite sim-
ply for opportunity, let alone equal opportunity .... [T]he decline 
in manufacturing and blue-collar jobs, once the mainstay of blacks 
in segregated communities, has caused many working class blacks to 
slip into poverty and the poor to become poorer. At the time of 
[Brown] there were at least still hard labor jobs in which a high 
school diploma was not really a necessity. Now, even factory jobs 
require skill. Problems with our economy and competitiveness can-
not be separated from our education system. This country cannot 
afford to have a huge segment of our society that is not well-edu-
cated, well-skilled, well-trained, and productive.198 
195. During Rehnquist's initial confirmation hearing, a memorandum he wrote while a law 
clerk for Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson about the petitioner's argument in Brown 
surfaced, the pertinent parts of this memorandum read: 
In these cases now before the Court, the Court is, as [Attorney John] Davis suggested, 
being asked to read its own sociological views into the Constitution. . . . To the argu-
ment made by Thurgood, not John Marshall that a majority may not deprive a minority 
of its constitutional right, the answer must be made that while this is sound in theory, in 
the long run it is the majority who will determine what the constitutional rights of the 
minority are. One hundred and fifty years of attempts on the part of this Court to 
protect minority rights of any kind-whether those of business, slaveholders, or Jeho-
vah's witnesses-have all met the same fate. One by one the cases establishing such 
rights have been sloughed off, and crept silently to rest . . . . If this Court, because its 
members individually are "liberal" and dislike segregation, now chooses to strike it 
down, it differs from the McReynolds court only in the kinds of litigants it favors and 
the kinds of special claims it protects . . .. I realize that it is an unpopular and un-
humanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated by "liberal" colleagues, but I 
think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed. 
Nomination of William H. Rehnquist, 92d Cong., 117 CONGo REC. 45815 (1971) (William Rehn-
quist's memorandum to Justice Jackson concerning Brown). At the time, Rehnquist denied that 
the memorandum reflected his personal opinions, a claim countered by Justice Jackson's long-
time secretary, Elsie Douglas. SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 15 n.14 
(1989). More recently Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in Columbus Board of 
Education v. Penick: "the Constitution does not command that school boards not under an af-
firmative duty to desegregate follow a policy of 'integration uber alles.''' 443 U.S. 449, 513 
(1979). 
196. Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 6. 
197. [d. at 39. Among the steps they suggest to help address resegregation are housing subsi-
dies to help low income families gain access to middle class schools; increased use of magnet, 
charter schools and school vouchers to increase the educational choices for all students; and 
emphasizing to Americans the substantial benefits white children gain from integrated exper-
iences. [d. at 40. 
198. Carter, supra note 66, at 893. 
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Fifty years after Brown the ultimate goal for most black Ameri-
can parents remains unchanged-to secure equal educational oppor-
tunities for their children. There also is the question of how to 
measure what constitutes equality in a multi-racial and multi-cultural 
society with a long history of racial discrimination and white 
supremacy. Currently we seem to be in a catch-22, because equality is 
usually measured by the educational opportunities and attainments of 
middle and upper income white Americans. Perhaps we need to de-
velop alternate measures of equality, at least in public education. 
Likewise, diversity in higher education is more than a short-term 
remedy for past and continuing societal discrimination. The remedial 
approach ignores the importance of an integrated education to the 
maintenance of a healthy, racially pluralistic democracy. Further, the 
remedial diversity rationale does not even acknowledge that black 
Americans still are not accepted as social equals, full American citi-
zens. Robert Carter, in explaining the continuing educational defi-
ciencies of black students wrote: "[l]ow educational achievement 
among African-Americans ... resulted not from educational inferi-
ority of blacks but from racism as evidenced by the structure of school 
financing, and by the structured expectation in our schools that black 
children will fail."199 Integration alone will not address this reality. 
Despite the somewhat gloomy picture painted in this essay, there 
still are many reasons to celebrate the 1954 Brown decision. First, 
Brown was the product of black lawyers200 who with black and white 
civil rights activists, successfully fought against legally mandated racial 
segregation. Second, Brown signaled the end of the Plessy "separate 
but equal doctrine." Third, the post-Brown era opened educational 
and economic opportunities not previously available to most black 
and other non-white Americans. Finally, Brown held out the promise 
of full equality-full citizenship-for black Americans. This last 
promise unfortunately remains unrealized fifty years later. Fulfilling 
it must be our focus today and for the near future. But as one scholar 
reminds us: "[b]ecause discrimination in education is intimately con-
nected to discrimination in other social institutions[;] we cannot ex-
pect to alleviate the former without concomitant efforts to eliminate 
the latter.''201 
199. [d. at 889. 
200. Robert Carter argued the case against Kansas; Thurgood Marshall argued the case 
against South Carolina; Spotswood Robinson, III argued the case against Virginia; Louis Red-
ding and Jack Greenberg argued the case against Delaware; and George C. Hayes and James M. 
Nabrit, Jr. argued the companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, against the District of Columbia. All 
but Greenberg were black. Numerous other African-American lawyers aided in crafting the 
briefs in these cases. 
201. Mickelson, supra note 1, at 1481. 
